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Because of the concentrated distribution of interest rates on outstanding mortgages, modest
interest rate declines in 1997 and 1998 made refinancing a smart choice for a record number
of homeowners. In addition, the strong economy and the age of mortgage loans likely 
contributed to the surge in refinancing activity.
In 1998, interest rates on mortgages dropped to their
lowest levels in nearly five years, prompting a record
amount of refinancing activity. Refinancings typically
rise following a drop in rates as homeowners seek to
capture interest savings. The 1998 surge, however, was
strikingly large relative to the size of the interest rate
declines that triggered it. From mid-1997 to early 1998,
thirty-year mortgage rates fell about 1 percentage point,
from just over 8 percent to just over 7 percent. During
the same period, refinancing applications increased
nearly sevenfold. When rates fell modestly again in the
second half of 1998, refinancing soared to even higher
levels. Indeed, the increases in refinancing activity
were so extraordinary that they caught even some
experienced mortgage market participants by surprise.1
This edition of Current Issues in Economics and
Finance examines why refinancings responded so 
dramatically to lower interest rates in 1998. We show
that at the end of 1997, a particularly large proportion
of outstanding mortgage loans had interest rates
slightly above the rates available on new mortgages.
When interest rates fell, the gap between the rates on
existing and new mortgages widened sufficiently to
make the refinancing of these outstanding loans eco-
nomically advantageous. As a result, an unusually large
number of homeowners chose to refinance in 1998.
The high concentration of loans that became cost
effective to refinance, however, cannot account for all
of the surge in refinancing activity. Favorable economic
conditions also appear to have encouraged many home-
owners to refinance. In addition, the high proportion of
“moderately seasoned” mortgages in 1998—that is,
mortgages that are between two and five years old—
may have contributed to the increase in refinancing
activity.
Broad Effects of Mortgage Refinancing
Mortgage refinancing alters the flow of wealth among
households, financial intermediaries, and investors and
can have both positive and negative implications for the
economy. Homeowners clearly benefit: by refinancing
their mortgages at a lower rate, they often realize sub-
stantial savings. For example, consider the homeowner
who pays a fixed rate of 8 percent on a thirty-year mort-
gage of $200,000. If market rates on mortgages fall to 
7 percent, then this homeowner could reduce his or her
monthly mortgage payment from $1,468 to $1,331 by
refinancing at the lower rate. While the transaction
costs of refinancing partly offset this gain, the house-
hold savings over the life of the mortgage could be 
considerable. In turn, such savings could help boost
consumer spending on goods and services. 
Offsetting these benefits, however, are the costs to
mortgage lenders. When a large number of borrowers
refinance, banks and thrifts that own mortgages and
investors in mortgage-backed securities such as mutual
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quently, these investors may cut back on other financial
outlays to compensate for potential losses in the mort-
gage market.
Surges in mortgage refinancings can also lead to
reallocations of income within the financial services
industry. Mortgage servicers typically earn fee income
based on the size of existing loan pools. When old mort-
gages are prepaid as part of the refinancing process,
loan pools will shrink, causing the service fee income
from these loans to decline.2 By contrast, some partici-
pants in the mortgage market—including mortgage
bankers and other originators, loan underwriters, and
distributors of new mortgage-backed securities—may
earn higher fees when refinancing applications rise. 
Mortgage Interest Rates and the 1998 
Refinancing Surge
Although certain mortgage market participants realize
benefits from refinancing, the most important factor
driving refinancing activity is the potential interest sav-
ings accruing to homeowners. The close connection
between market interest rates and refinancing activity
is apparent in Chart 1, which plots the average contract
rate for new thirty-year fixed rate mortgages against an
index of refinancing applications produced by the
Mortgage Bankers Association.3 We see that through-
out the 1990s, each decline in rates precipitated a rise
in refinancing activity. 
For most of the decade, the increases in refinancing
applications were commensurate in size with the
decline in interest rates that triggered them. In 1998,
however, the response of refinancing to rate declines
was disproportionately large. After mortgage contract
rates dropped 100 basis points—a relatively modest
decline of l percentage point—between April 1997 and
January 1998, refinancing activity jumped. Refinanc-
ings moderated somewhat in the spring of 1998 when
rates leveled off, but a further rate decline of about 
35 basis points prompted another, sharper spike in refi-
nancing activity during the second half of the year.
Chart 1 shows that during the first half of the 1990s,
rate declines comparable in size to those in 1997 and
1998 touched off smaller bursts of refinancing activity.
The break with this earlier pattern raises an important
question: If the interest rate savings available to home-
owners in 1998 were not exceptional, why was mort-
gage refinancing activity so vigorous? The answer
requires an understanding of the important role played
by the distribution of rates on outstanding mortgages. 
The Changing Distribution of Existing Mortgage Rates
Homeowners typically refinance a fixed rate mortgage
if the rate they pay exceeds the rate available on new
mortgages by 50 to 200 basis points—that is, by ½ to 
2 percentage points.4 Mortgages that meet this refi-
nancing threshold, or a more narrowly defined thresh-
old, can be called “in-the-money.” Thus, in aggregate,
how much refinancing activity follows a given rate
drop depends largely on the proportion of homeowners
whose loans are in-the-money after the interest rate
adjustment. 
The distribution of rates on outstanding mortgage
loans changes substantially over time (Chart 2). At the
end of 1991, most mortgage loans held rates of about
10 percent, the prevailing interest rate at the time that
these loans were originated in the 1980s.5  As mortgage
rates fell over most of the next two years, a series of
refinancing waves followed, peaking in the fall of 1993.
The concentration of loans in the 10 percent neighbor-
hood was largely eliminated by the 1992-93 refinanc-
ings, and the distribution of existing coupons was much
flatter by the end of that year.
After 1993, new loans were originated for several
years in the 7 to 9 percent range, eventually resulting in
a denser concentration of coupon rates. By the end of
1997, an estimated 83 percent of mortgage loans fell in
the 7.25 to 8.75 percent range, and 53 percent carried
rates between 7.50 and 8.25 percent. As market rates 
on new thirty-year fixed rate loans dropped toward 
7 percent in January 1998, the spread between the mar-
ket rates and rates on most outstanding mortgages
entered the 50-to-200-basis-point range that normally
triggers refinancing. As a result, refinancings rose to
record highs.
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Chart 1  
Mortgage Rates and Refinancings 
Sources:  Mortgage Bankers Association; Federal Housing Finance Board.
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ScaleTo illustrate the link between the distribution of
mortgage rates and the number of refinancings, we plot
existing mortgages that are in-the-money alongside
aggregate refinancing activity (Chart 3). For simplicity,
we measure in-the-money mortgages as the percentage
of outstanding thirty-year loans with rates exceeding
the current market rate by at least 100 basis points, or 
1 percentage point.6 Once again, our measure of refi-
nancing is the Mortgage Bankers Association index of
refinancing applications. As the chart shows, the two
series track each other’s movements very closely, 
suggesting that a strong relationship exists between the
distribution of existing mortgages that are cost effective
to refinance and aggregate refinancing activity.
Statistical Models of Aggregate Refinancing
To assess the relationship between refinancings and 
the distribution of mortgage rates more precisely, we
estimate a series of statistical models of aggregate 
refinancing activity from 1990 to 1998 (see table).7 The
models allow us to measure the degree to which the
interest rate spread, the distribution of existing 
mortgage coupons, and other factors can explain refi-
nancing activity.8
Because changes in interest rates motivate most
homeowner decisions to refinance, we first estimate a
simple model (Model 1) relating refinancing activity to
an interest rate spread, measured as the average thirty-
year contract rate offered in the primary market less the
median interest rate on outstanding thirty-year fixed
rate mortgages.9 The model estimates confirm that 
this mortgage spread is a key determinant of refinanc-
ing, explaining about 72 percent of this activity in the
1990-98 period. 
We then include the distribution of existing mort-
gage interest rates as measured by two variables—the 
3
Chart 2
Distribution of Outstanding Thirty-Year Fixed Mortgage
Rates, 1991-98
Fourth-quarter 1991
Percent of total outstanding
Source:  Bloomberg L.P.
Notes:  Coupon rates on the horizontal axis are adjusted to correspond to the
contract mortgage rates actually paid by households on thirty-year Fannie Mae, 
Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac loans. Each bar sums two consecutive quarter-point
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Chart 3  
In-the-Money Mortgages and Refinancings
Note:  In-the-money thirty-year MBS is the percentage of existing thirty-year 
mortgage-backed securities issued by government agencies (Fannie Mae,
Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac) that have interest rates at least 100 basis
points above the current thirty-year contract rate.




















Scalepercentage of in-the-money mortgages and the percent-
age of newly in-the-money mortgages (Model 2).10 The
latter variable, calculated as the change in the percent-
age of in-the-money mortgages from the preceding
quarter, is designed to capture the surge in refinancing
that occurs when an especially large number of mort-
gages have just become economical to refinance and
many homeowners take action immediately. Both con-
centration variables have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on refinancing, and together they
improve our model predictions about 5 percent.
Moreover, the two concentration variables claim some
of the explanatory power attributed to the spread vari-
able in the simple model.11 Overall, the interest rate
spread and the distribution of rates together appear to
explain about 77 percent of the refinancing activity. 
In Model 3, we introduce the unemployment rate as
an indicator of the state of the economy. Our hypothesis
is that refinancings may have responded so strongly to
interest rate incentives because the overall economy
was strong. Solid employment prospects could help
boost home prices, borrower creditworthiness, and
lender confidence, leading previously cautious borrow-
ers to refinance. Our results confirm the link between
favorable economic conditions and refinancing: adding
the unemployment rate raises the model’s explanatory
power another 7 percent.12
Finally, we examine the role of mortgage seasoning
in the 1998 refinancing wave. Seasoning is defined as
the amount of time since a loan was originated. Other
factors equal, unseasoned loans (loans two years or 
less from origination) and seasoned loans (loans more
than five years from origination) are less likely to be
refinanced than moderately seasoned loans.13 Thus, 
the existence of a high proportion of moderately 
seasoned mortgages could help fuel refinancing activ-
ity following an interest rate drop.
Evidence of the importance of seasoning can be
found by comparing mortgage market developments in
1995 with those in 1998 (Chart 1). One reason that 
refinancing activity may have remained so mild in 1995
is that a heavy bout of refinancing had just occurred
two years earlier. Given the heavy wave of lending in
1993, many outstanding loans in 1995 would have been
fairly new and thus less likely to be refinanced. By late
1997, however, these same loans would have become
moderately seasoned and may have contributed to the
high level of 1998 refinancing activity. 
In Model 4, we test the effect of seasoning by sepa-
rating the mortgage loans in our sample into two 
categories—those that are seasoned and those that are
new or moderately seasoned. (Unfortunately, our data
do not permit us to distinguish new from moderately
seasoned loans.) We then calculate in-the-money mort-
gages and newly in-the-money mortgages for each of
the two categories. We estimate our full model, which
includes the interest rate spread, the unemployment
rate, and separate measures of in-the-money and newly
in-the-money mortgages for both seasoned mortgages
and new and moderately seasoned mortgages. 
Our results support the conclusion that the level of
refinancing activity is affected by the seasoning of
mortgage loans. For new and moderately seasoned
loans, the concentration variables have a significant
effect on refinancing, while for seasoned loans, these
variables show no significant effects. Thus, it appears
that the rate distribution for new and moderately 
Refinancing Models
Measures of Mortgage Coupon Concentration
Spread In-the-Money Mortgages Newly in-the-Money Mortgages Unemployment Rate Adjusted R2
Model 1 -1.326*** — — — 0.72
(0.120)
Model 2 -0.6981*** 0.0187** 0.0163** — 0.77
(0.2152) (0.0081) (0.0065)
Model 3 -0.4259* 0.0401*** 0.0118** -0.8423*** 0.84
(0.2400) (0.0096) (0.0060) (0.2033)
N&M Seasoned N&M Seasoned
Model 4 -0.6209** 0.0390*** -0.0103 0.0136** -0.0071 -0.8219*** 0.86
(0.2286) (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0059) (0.0080) (0.1293)
Notes:  All regressions were run using quarterly data from third-quarter 1990 to third-quarter 1998. N&M—new and moderately seasoned mortgages—consist of mortgages that
are five years or less from origination. Seasoned mortgages are those that are more than five years from origination. Newey-West standard errors appear in parentheses. Standard
tests suggested no significant serial correlation in the error terms.
*Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
**Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
***Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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attributed to concentration in the earlier regressions.
Chart 4 illustrates the gain in explanatory power that
comes with the full model and confirms the importance
of rate concentration and a buoyant economy in explain-
ing the dramatic 1998 rise in mortgage refinancing. The
simple model, relying exclusively on the rate spread,
predicts a substantially smaller increase in refinancing
in 1998 than actually occurred. But with the addition of
the two measures of concentration and the unemploy-
ment rate, the model tracks the course of last year’s refi-
nancing activity more closely.14 The full model captures
most of the surge in the first quarter of the year, when
the large concentration of loans clustered in the 7.50 to
8.25 percent rate range became cost effective to refi-
nance. It also captures the drop-off in refinancing in the
second quarter, after the most responsive households
had acted. Finally, it does a better job than the simple
model in predicting the high level of refinancing activity
in the third quarter of the year. While a modest decline in
interest rates during this quarter boosted refinancings,
the effects of concentration and a persistently low unem-
ployment rate helped to keep refinancing activity robust. 
Conclusion
What accounts for the unexpected strength of mortgage
refinancing activity in 1998? At the end of 1997, a very
large proportion of existing mortgages—many of which
had been originated within the past five years—had
rates slightly above market rates. As interest rates fell in
1997 and 1998, the spread between the rates on these
existing mortgages and the rates available on new mort-
gages widened to the point where refinancing became
economically advantageous. Combined with the effects
of a strong economy, the high concentration of out-
standing loans—particularly moderately seasoned
loans—that suddenly met this threshold explains why
refinancings rose so quickly and persisted at such high
levels in 1998.
Notes
1. For instance, see “A Market That Quivers as Refinancings Rise,”
New York Times, February 8, 1998, late edition; LEX Comment,
Financial Times, February 5, 1998; “Unlike `93, Current Wave of
Refinancings Hasn’t Rocked MBS Market—Yet,” Investor Dealers’
Digest, January 26, 1998; and “Refinancing Boom Is Year Long
Affair,” National Mortgage News, October 12, 1998. 
2. Consider, for example, the losses associated with early 1998
refinancings, discussed in National Mortgage News (1998).
Servicing rights agreements entitle servicers to a payment equal to a
set percent (for example, 0.5 percent) of an outstanding mortgage
pool (not unlike interest). The value of these rights declines as mort-
gage prepayments rise. Similarly, investors in interest-only compo-
nents of collateralized mortgage obligations suffer losses when a
pool of loans prepays rapidly because the anticipated interest to be
paid over the life of the pool decreases.
3. The seasonally adjusted Mortgage Bankers Association
Refinance Index is constructed from a weekly survey of applica-
tions to refinance existing mortgages. Conducted since 1990, the
survey covers about 40 percent of the residential real estate market
in the United States; respondents include mortgage bankers, com-
mercial bankers, and thrifts. A complete description of the index is
available in “Weekly Mortgage Application Survey, Description,
Indexes and Interest Rates,” March 22, 1995, Mortgage Bankers
Association, Washington, D.C. 
4. See Follain, Scott, and Yang (1992) for a simulation model
analysis of the optimal rate gap for refinancing. Bennett, Peach,
and Peristiani (1998b) present a statistical analysis of the size of 
the rate gap that prompted refinancing in the 1984-94 period, con-
ditional on credit, home equity, market volatility, and other 
variables.
5. The data in Chart 2 measure the size of pass-through mortgage-
backed securities of the three large government-related mortgage
agencies—Fannie Mae, Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac. These securi-
ties pass homeowner payments of interest and principal—net a ser-
vicing charge of about 50 basis points—through to investors. A large
portion of, but not all, home loans qualify for inclusion in agency
pools. Nevertheless, common interest rate swings affect all borrow-
ers; thus, the shape of the distribution of existing agency security
rates should be reasonably representative of the distribution of out-
standing rates paid by all borrowers on thirty-year fixed rate loans.
6. This estimate is consistent with recent work on incentives to
refinance. For example, see Follain, Scott, and Yang (1992) and
Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (1998b). 
7. In all of the regression models reported in the table, the depen-
dent variable is the ratio of the Mortgage Bankers Association index
of refinancing applications to the number of owner-occupied homes
with outstanding residential mortgages. The data on the number of
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Chart 4  
Comparison of Model Performances
Notes:  The chart compares the actual values of the Mortgage Bankers 
Association Refinance Index with the values predicted by the statistical models 
described in the text. The simple model (Model 1) includes the interest rate 
spread, a time trend, and a constant. The full model (Model 4) includes the 
concentration variables adjusted for seasoning, the unemployment rate, a time 
trend, and a constant.
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outstanding residential mortgages are from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s American Housing Survey. Because this survey is con-
ducted biannually, we created quarterly observations on the stock of
mortgages by interpolating data using a cubic spine technique. 
8. Each model listed in the table also includes a constant term and
a time trend. The time trend variable, which captures the general
increase in the propensity to refinance existing mortgages over
time, is statistically significant in most regressions. Previous stud-
ies, such as Bennett, Peach, and Peristiani (1998a), suggest that this
increased propensity may reflect lower transaction costs and
increased competitiveness among mortgage-lending institutions.
In addition to estimating the four models reported in the table,
we experimented with models that incorporated interest rate vola-
tility and home price appreciation—two variables that previous
studies, such as Caplin, Freeman, and Tracy (1997) and Peristiani 
et al. (1997), have shown to affect refinancings. These models are
not reported because in our aggregate-level equations neither 
variable is statistically significant and their exclusion did not sig-
nificantly affect the coefficients on the other explanatory variables.
9. The median rate is the rate in the middle of the distribution of
existing thirty-year fixed rate mortgages in Fannie Mae, Ginnie
Mae, and Freddie Mac mortgage pools. For skewed distributions—
such as the distribution of outstanding mortgage coupons shown in
Chart 2—the median, rather than the average, may be a better mea-
sure of the “center” of the distribution. 
10. We define in-the-money mortgages as loans exceeding the
market rate by at least 100 basis points. In our regressions, we tried
several alternative thresholds ranging from 50 to 200 basis points.
Assuming a 150-basis-point threshold produced results very similar
to those reported in the table. Using 50- and 200-basis-point thresh-
olds produced results that differed somewhat from the results
reported in Table 1 but that had the expected sign and were statisti-
cally significant.
11. This conclusion is based on a comparison of the coefficients
and standard errors on the spread variable in the two models. The
addition of the concentration variables in Model 2 reduces, but does
not eliminate, both the economic and the statistical importance of
the spread variable.
12. Adding the unemployment rate to our model does, however,
make the time trend variable statistically insignificant. Because the
unemployment rate was generally declining during the 1990s, it
appears to be picking up both the effects of improved economic
conditions on refinancings as well as the general increase in refi-
nancing activity.
13. For a discussion of the effect of seasoning on refinancing, see
Richard and Roll (1989) or Fabozzi and Modigliani (1992, p. 208).
14. The model also successfully predicts the 1992-93 surge in refi-
nancing activity, although this episode is not shown in the chart.
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